Cybersecurity
The full domain, and the other capabilities within it.
Detect and contain what reaches the endpoint, and see it alongside everything else.
Endpoint detection and response puts a sensor on the device and gives you the ability to see process behaviour, not just files. Extended detection and response (XDR) joins that endpoint telemetry to identity, email and network signal, so a single alert carries the context needed to judge it.
The tools are mature; the failures are almost never the sensor. They are coverage gaps, detections left at vendor defaults, and nobody owning what happens between an alert firing and a machine being isolated. That is where this work concentrates.
If more than one of these is true, this is usually the right place to start.
| Deliverable | What it contains |
|---|---|
| Coverage baseline | Inventory against deployed agents, with every uncovered system listed and a reason: not yet, cannot, or will not. |
| Tuned detection set | Detections mapped to MITRE ATT&CK technique, each with a stated intent and the noise it was tuned against. |
| Response playbooks | Per scenario: containment action, authority to act, notification path, and the evidence to preserve before acting. |
| Handover pack | Runbooks, escalation matrix, and a walkthrough with the team who will hold it after we leave. |
A reference, not a template. Your estate decides which parts apply and in what order they arrive.
Targets are agreed with you before the work starts, and reported against for its duration.
Yes, materially. Signature antivirus asks whether a file is known to be bad. EDR records process behaviour, parent-child relationships and network calls, so it can flag a chain of individually legitimate actions. It also lets you go back and answer what happened, which antivirus cannot.
Modern agents are light, but exclusions and scan policy decide the outcome, and inherited exclusions are a common source of both slowness and blind spots. We measure impact on a representative sample before a wide rollout rather than after complaints.
Correlation. An impossible-travel sign-in is weak on its own and so is a suspicious script, but together on the same identity within ten minutes they are a strong signal. XDR is the plumbing that lets a detection be written across those sources.
For some scenarios, yes — a confirmed ransomware pattern should not wait for a phone call. For others, automatic isolation of a production system causes the outage the attacker wanted. The playbook decides per scenario, and you approve that split before it goes live.
You need someone to act on what it finds. That can be your team with playbooks, or a managed service. What does not work is deploying the tool and treating the console as something to check when there is time.
Often that is the higher-value engagement. An existing deployment already has the coverage data and the noise history, so tuning starts from evidence rather than assumption.
The full domain, and the other capabilities within it.
Posture management, workload protection and entitlement control for AWS, Azure and GCP — with misconfiguration caught in the pipeline, not in production.
Single sign-on, multi-factor authentication, privileged access and joiner-mover-leaver — built so access is granted deliberately and removed automatically.
The fastest way to a useful answer is a short, scoped look at what you already have.